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The purpose of this paper is to conduct a critical evaluation of
the Negative Income Tax/Income Maintenance Experiments (NIT/1M) which
were completed between 1968-1983. The main issue that will be examined
is whether we can identify variations in administrative procedures,
rules and regulations that impact on: a) labor-supply response; i.e.,
going to work; and b) the break up of marital or household units.
The NIT/1M experiments were primarily conducted to determine the
overall labor supply effects of individuals and families when
administered a guaranteed income. An equally compelling reason,
however, for conducting the exp~riments was to test an administrative
model. Beginning with the first experiment, it became readily apparent
that the manner by which cash allotments were administered; i.e., the
rules, regulations. and policies denoting program restrictions and
defining the amount of administration, was intricately linked with the
measurement of labor-supply effects. By varying technical program
requirements, labor-supply effects could be observed under different
types of administrative conditions. This in turn would create a
broader picture by which to assess the responsiveness of an
administrative system and also permit selection of those key elements
and technical features that could be incorporated into current income
maintenance programs such as AFDC/AFDC-UP.
Overview of the NIT/1M Research Design
It is important to understand the essential features of the
experimental design in order to evaluate the administrative procedures,
rules, and regulations tested in the four NIT/1M experiments.
Historically, governmental agencies have used nonexperimental data;
i.e., program evaluation and statistical analyses of cross-sectional
data to analyze potential social welfare policies and programs in this
country. What is innovative about the NIT/1M studies was the idea of
using experimental data to assess the potential effects of a program on
public policy.
The NIT/1M resesarch design involved the scheduling of
observations; the choice of treatments and comparisons; the selection
of measured control variables; and the manner of assigning units to
treatments; for example, a modified version of random assignment. It
is this last aspect which characterized the NIT/1M experiments as more
quasi-experimental in practice (Cook & Campbell, 1979, p.343) because
a random selection of the entire population was not drawn in selecting
participants for the NIT/1M field studies.
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Despite the administrative complexities, legal and political
pressures as well as other analytical problems in administering a
quasi~experiment. it was believed to be a superior research method by
which to collect quality data and study complex social influences,
processess, and changes in life-like settings. (Boruch & Riecken,
1975; Cook & Campbell, 1979; Ferber & Hirsch, 1978; Rivlin, 1974)
Because quasi-experimental designs approximate more closely criterion
based on the scientific method, they seem to have a "halo II effect among
legislative officials who trust the programmatic results as being more
reliable.
In comparison to non-experimental data sources, social
experimentation/quasi-experimentation has certain advantages. For
example, social experimentation's strength lies in its ability to
determine the direction of causality between a dependent variable
(effect) and an independent variable (cause). Since the experimenters
were analyzing data generated by an experiment, some degree of
uniformity was observed in assessing similar behavioral outcomes in all
of the NIT/1M field studies. To illustrate, the basic goal of the
NIT/1M experimental resesarch was to determine the effects of a series
of experimental treatments on individual and family behavior.
Experimental effects were recorded and evaluated for many types of
behavior such as a desire for marital stability, expenditure patterns,
occupational choices and changes, and child care usuage. Because these
experimental effects (independent variables) were "manipulated" in the
environment and observed over a period of time, the direction ~f
causality between changes in income (net wage rates) and behavioral
responses was measured fairly accurately.
Another essential feature of quasi- experimentation is that of
controlled comparison. A quasi- experiment seeks to provide
information on the effects of a given treatment which can be
generalized to populations other than the one being studied.
Experimental results can be generalized to the larger population
because random assignment is used in creating a comparison and
experimental group. Individuals in both the comparison and
experimental group are followed over a designated period of time;
their behavior is assessed before, during, and after the experimental
treatment. This "panel feature" of experimental data enables the
experimenter to observe changes such as inconsistencies in the
behavior patterns of program participants. This prOVides a valuable
source of information to that of nonexperimental data.
In each of the experiments, sample low~income families were
assigned either to one of several income conditioned transfer programs
or to a control group. The behavior of all control and experimental
families was carefully monitored over a designated time period.
The New Jersey-Pennsylvania NIT/1M Experiment (Urban) 1968-1971
Conducted for three years, this field study, concentrated on the
urban poor in five eastern cities (four in New Jersey and one in
Pennsylvania). The purpose was to test the response of primarily
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White, Black, and Spanish-American male-headed non-welfare families
be·tween the ages of 18-58 to a "NIT" program (N~1359).
North Carolina-Iowa NIT/1M Experiment (Rural) 1969-1973
The principle purpose of the Rural experiment was to measure the
effect of a "NIT" on the work effort of low income families in small
towns and farms. A large proportion of the rural poor were
self-employed farmers. The responses of the rural families was
expected to provide a comparative data base with that of the urban
poor. Program eligibility was extended to single households as well
as those headed by females and the aged (N-809).
Gary NIT/1M Experiment (GIME) 1971-1974
GIME focused on a key segment of the welfare population which had
been largely ignored in prior NIT/1M experiments; i.e., Black families
with only one adult present usually female headed and with at least one
dependent. The preponderance of female-headed households with small
children led to the incorporation of a day-care treatment variable.
GIME also included a social service treatment variable in which
selected families were eligible for both day care subsidies and
information and referral services. Families eligible to participate
were selected from both experimental and control groups (N~1780).
Seattle-Denver NIT/1M Experiment (SIME/DIMEl 1971-1983
SIME/DIME represents the culmination of experience and knowledge
acquired from administering the preceeding field studies. Displaying a
higher degree of complexity, SIME/DIME has the notriety of being the
largest, longest, and most elaborately administered social experiment
yet undertaken in this country. A sample of White, Black, Chicano two
parent and one parent households were enrolled. SIME/DIME administered
an educational; i.e., training/counseling subsidy program to estimate
the effectiveness of implementing manpower/work training programs in
current and future income maintenance policies (N=4800).
Labor Supply Results
Several plans of varying generosity were tested in each of the
experiments. The choice of particular benefit reduction rates and
support levels partially reflected the generosity of the public
assistance program in each of the states selected as experimental
sites; i.e., AFDC and Foodstamps. The average tax or benefit reduction
rate was about 50%. The average guarantee or support level was
slightly less than 100% of the poverty line. SIME/DIME vrovided the
most generous experimental plans--eleven combinations of guarantees and
tax schedules were tested. (Refer to Table 1)
Practical considerations required that the experimental payments
exceed the existing public assistance payments in each of the site
locations. This assured that experimental families would be better
off, for example, as compared to those participating in a local AFDC
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program. There were important differences in the level of benefits
available to families enrolled in the AFDC and Foodstamp programs
between the Urban and SIME/DIME sites. In the SIME/DIME site, the
guarantee levels exceeded the maximum benefits available from AFDC and
Foodstamps for the designated medium and high guarantee levels. For
example, the lowest guarantee level was approximately equal to the
AFDC and Foodstamp support level. In the Urban, the experimental
support levels were initially more generous than the state's AFDC and
Foodstamp programs; however, shortly after enrollment began, New
Jersey significantly increased the level of AFDC benefits as well as
extended AFDC benefit levels to cover two parent families. This
obviously biased the research design whereby administrative rules
regarding income level were in actuality lower than experimental
payments.
One of the major problems in administering the NIT/1M field
studies was extracting data on- earnings over a limited time period. For
example, the Urban, Rural, and GIME were administered for only three
years. It is very difficult to assess the long term effects of these
experiments when the experimental treatment was of such short
duration. To resolve, in part, time limitations, the duration of the
financial treatments was extended in SIME/DIME to three subsamples
consisting of three, five, and seven years.
Even though overall results indicated that participants will work
less when given money, on average, experimental participants did not
massively withdraw from the labor market.
In the Urban, white males reduced their hours of work only 1.5%
less than that of the comparison group. White wives were observed to
work 23% fewer hours than wives in the comparison group. The
experimental wives' employment rate was 24% less than the comparison
group; their average earnings per week were 20.3% less relative to the
comparison group. It was predominantly secondary earners (wives,
teenagers, and older workers) who withdrew from the labor force.
However, this behavioral response can be interpreted as highly
appropriate in that a women by choice may desire to work inside the
horne; a teenager may decide it is better to complete his/her education;
and older workers approaching retirement may desire spending more time
devoted to leisure activities.
In the Rural, a small percentage of husbands, predominantly
non-farm wage earners, quit work and/or reduced the number of hours
worked. This decline in hours worked tended to be smaller on average
than in the Urban. With respect to farm families, it was generally
discovered that farmers in the experimental group reduced their hours
of work for wages relative to the control group of farmers. As the
designers of the experiment had not expected farmers to reduce their
time on non-farm gainful activities, but rather to increase the amount
of time spent on farming, these labor supply responses are puzzling.
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Prime age married males reduced their hours of work from 2% to
6.5%. Female heads of families reduced their hours of work from 25% to
30%. (Kehrer, McDonald, & Moffitt, 1980, pp. 59-106) No significant
response was found for wives. These differences in labor-supply
response rates may be due to particular characteristics of the sample
population in Gary. Gary's job market was rather inflexible during the
time of the expe~iment. Differences observed in hours of work may be
due to differences in recipient's employment status. The lower income
of female headed households in GIME may point to their greater
dependency on such public assistance programs as AFDC in comparison to
female heads of households in SIME/DIME, who did not display as great a
tendency to rely on such income assistance programs. The findings for
wives was disconcerting in that it was observed .that the wives
experienced the greatest work disincentive of any group. This may have
been due to the lack of job opportunities in the area for both
full-time, career-oriented workers as well as for part-time casual
workers.
SIME/DIME
In general. the labor supply response in SIME/DIME was similar for
each family group. It was observed that annual hours of work in the
second experimental year declined by 9% for husbands; 21% for wives;
14% for single female heads; 24% for male youths; and 18% for.female
youths. These estimated impacts in SIME/DIME are averages over the
eleven NIT treatments tested and combine the responses of three and
five year sample families, truncated on the basis of income. (Robins &
West. 1983, p. 94)
For all groups, a major impact of the experiment was on the
periods of nonemployment which increase between 40% and 70%. The
labor force participation rate of women in the control group increased
significantly during the experiment. It appears that the experiment
may have delayed entry in the work force for a sizeable· number of women
receiving NIT benefits. Males in general, rather than Withdrawing from
the labor force, appeared to have spent more time searching for
employment in response to the experiment. (Robins & West, 1983. pp.
91-198)
In the three and five year subsample. it appeared that Blacks and
Chicanos responded more to the experimental treatment as compared
with Whites. For three-year families, the maximum response for annual
hours of work was a 15% decline. The maximum response for five-year
families was approximately a 27% decline. As was found with husbands.
there were no significant race-ethnic or site differences in response
for wives. White wives appear to respond somewhat less than Black and
Chicano wives, but this difference is present only for three-year
families. (Robins & West. 1983. p.124)
For single females enrolled in the three-year subsample l the
response was approximately a 22% decline. During the first three
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year~, the responses of three and five-year single female heads are not
significantly different (unlike husbands and wives), although the
responses of five~year families exceed the responses of three-year
families by a slight amount. In the fourth and fifth years, the
responses of five year families continue to grow. The maximum response
in hours of work is approximately a 32% decline. Hence, while there
was no evidence for differential response according to the length of
treatment for single female heads, there is evidence that adjustment to
the NIT treatments takes longer than the five years the experimental
group was observed.
Comparison of Labor Supply Results for All Experimental Sites
Robins and West (1983) have analyzed labor supply findings across
the four experiments, selecting those estimates that are based on the
most similar sample selection criteria, time period, and"variable
specification. Their estimates exhibit a fairly consistent pattern for
each of the experiments. For example, reduction in hours worked varied
between 5% and 25%; employment rate reductions ranged from about 1% to
10%. Robins and West also observed that single female heads are the
least likely group to be responsive to a nationwide lINIT" because they
already face a fairly generous welfare system that is not universally
available to dual-headed families. Robins and West (1983) conclude:
on average ... husbands reduced their labor supply by
about the equivalent of two weeks of full time
employment ...wives and single female heads reduced their
labor supply about three weeks of full-time
employment ... youths reduced their labor supply about the
equivalent of four weeks of full-time employment. (p.
16)
These outcomes must be examined in relationship to rules and
regulations administered in each of the experiments. It may be
possible to identify particular administrative variables, which
variables when taken together, create a situation that makes going to
work not as attractive as receiving experimental payments. To
illustrate, the administrative procedures for the accounting period,
definitions of income, and tax rate associated with different income
categories may have had a strong impact on experimental participants'
decision to seek employment or not to seek employment. The accounting
period comprised flboth the frequency with which income and other
information was reported by experimental participants and the length of
time during which participants could he taxed." (Kershaw, 1978, p. 47)
Experimental payments made within a brief accounting period, for
example, a period of one month, are highly responsive to the immediate
needs of low income individuals, as individuals receive larger
payments at one time. On the other hand, a longer accounting period,
such as the annual accounting period employed in our current income
tax system, would probably fail to respond to a low income family's
immediate needs.
system
short
It was
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In e~ch of the experiments, a retrospective self-reporting
was'utilized so that the accounting period was of relatively
duration to take into account participant's immediate needs.
hoped that this monthly retrospective reporting system would increase
the ~ccurate reporting of income as well as lower overall
administrative costs. This is important to bear in mind in
extrapolating the NIT/1M research findings. The carry-over accounting
period in each of the experiments influenced the experimental tax rate;
i.e., the accounting period stream-lined the payments resulting from
changes in income. Consequently, this changes the tax rate for some
experimental participants which may have influenced participants'
decision either to work more or opt for more leisure.
Each of the NIT/1M experiments treated private and public transfer
payments differently than they did other benefit programs. The Urban,
Rural, and GIME rules provided that private transfer payments such as
alimony, child support, and voluntary support to individuals outside
the household, be treated as income and taxed at the experimental rate.
However, SIME/DIME's rules stated that such private transfer payments
were to be taxed at 50% of the value of the transfer payment.
Although SIME/DIME and GIME taxed public transfer payments such as
Unemployment Insurance and Social Security at 100% of its value, the
Urban and Rural experiments taxed such public transfer payments only at
the experimental rate. In addition, SIME/DIME's rules were more
liberal than the other three experiments 'in the number of public
transfer payments that were permitted. For example, the Urban, Rural,
and GIME rules automatically excluded families from further
participation if they received such public transfers as Aid to the
Blind, Aid to the Totally and Permanently Disabled and General
Assistance. In GIME, there appeared to be a II middle ground ll in that
Unemployment Insurance and Social Security were taxed at the
experimental rate; however, Foodstamps and other public assistance
transfer payments such as Old Age Assistance, Aid to the Permanently
and Totally Disabled, Aid to the Blind and General Assistance,
excluding AFDC, were taxed at 100%.
Another important administrative variable to take into account in
intepreting behavioral outcomes of experimental participants was the
definition of income. As long as a family's income was less than the
specified percentage of their assigned break-ev~n level of income, that
family was fully reimbursed for federal and state income and social
security taxes. If the family's income, however, rose above the
break~even level of income, they were reimbursed II at a declining and
ultimately disappearing tax rate." (Christophersen, 1983, p. 56)
In order to account for fluctuation of income in the Urban, Rural
and GIME, the concept of carry-over income was utilized. If the
family's income in any given month exceeded the break-even level, that
amount remaining was carried over and added to the income of future
months in the calculation of experimental benefits. No income was
carried over and added to the income of future months in the
calculation of experimental benefits. By way of contrast, in
SIME/DIME, in addition to the use of carry-over income, the
197
ex~erimenters drew upon a second and separate calculation each month--a
continuous historical accounting of twelve months of income. This
produced a composite sum of annual benefits amount to which a family
would have been entitled over the past twelve months. In turn, this
annual entitlement was subtracted from the sum of the payments sent to
the family in each of the past eleven months. The amount which was
paid in the current month was the difference between the annual
entitlement and the sum of the payments sent to families.
These administrative variables; i.e., definition of income, tax
rate, and accounting period, must be weighed in interpreting
experimental participant's employment decisions. Administrators of
social welfare programs and policy-makers also need to take into
account other important administrative variables in measuring rules
and regulations on behavioral outcomes. These administrative variables
would include: 1) the definition of the filing unit; 2) the frequency
and method of contacting program participants; 3) participants'
understanding of program regulations and payment changes; 4) length
and complexity of the forms used to report income, assets, family size
and changes in family composition; and 5) extent and nature of audits
of self-administered reports, including problems pertaining to the
underreporting of income. (Kershaw, 1978, pp. 47-51)
Marital Dissolution Results
Although there was great interest in the relationship between
family instability and welfare dependency in the administration of all
the NIT/1M experiments, it was perhaps SIME/DIME that lent the greatest
opportunity to study the effects of a negative income tax on family
dissolution incentives. The NIT plans tested in SIME/DIME dramatically
increased the rate at which marriages dissolved among White and Black
couples; i.e., 40% to 60% and decreased the rate at which Chicano
women entered marriages; i.e., over 60%. (Hannan, Turna, & Groeneveld,
1983, p.365)
The differences in rules among the experiments are important in
understanding and interpreting differences in marital break-up. Rules
defining family composition patterns can be identified as having a
noteable impact on a family's decision either to separate or to remain
together, especially the rules defining cohabitation. To illustrate,
SIME/DIME permitted new families who were either married or living
together to spin-off from already enrolled families and remain eligible
for further experim~nta1 payments. Family heads who split up would
each retain eligibility for income maintenance grants. When an
individual; i.e., a family head entered into a new family arrangement
either'through marriage or through cohabitation, the individual would
still continue to receive experimental payments. If this newly formed
family eventually separated during the course of the experiment, the
eligible individual enrolled in the original family unit would still
receive experimental benefits. This ruling, labeled the "dowry effect"
by Christophersen (1983) actually allowed an originally enrolled person
to enter into a whole sequence of marital/cohabital relationships
during the experiment. Whenever, the marital or cohabital union ended,
198
the spouse/cohabitee and their respective families would also be
eligible to receive benefits and 'thus free to form new family units. A
flat rate of $1000 (1971 dollars) was payable to adult members who left
the household unit regardless of what experimental plan the families
had been assigned. This flat rate amount was adjusted by cost of
living increases every year the individual was enrolled in the
experiment. To contrast, in the Urban, there were no provisions for
cohabitation per se, although the initial eligibility rules defined a
household as people liVing together who pooled income and expenses. In
the Rural, families could split, remarry or cohabit and still remain
eligible to receive experimental payments. However, if an originally
enrolled person left his or her cohabitee, the cohabitee did not remain
eligible for benefits. It is interesting to note that because of
Indiana law, GIME did not explicitly provide for cohabitation in its
family composition unit definitions. However, if the cohabitation
commenced subsequent to enrollment, such cohabitation among family
units was permitted.
Rules defining cohabital relationships in each of the experiments
further can be correlated with rules pertaining to income guarantees
based on family composition changes. Rules pertaining to income
guarantees may also be identified as having a nateable impact on a
family's decision to either remain together or to separate. To
illustrate, if one spouse left with the children in SIME/DIME, that new
family unit would retain 83% of the original guarantee for an original
family of four. In comparison to SIME/DIME, a family enrolled in the
Urban and Rural would have retained less than 70% of the original
guarantee. Thus, it was far less costly for a family in SIME/DIME to
break up than for a family in the Urban and Rural, especially for a
spouse who had custody of the children. (Christophersen, 1983, p.48)
In contrast, a husband who left his wife and children in GIME was not
eligible to receive payments. It is postulated that these differences
in rules between GIME and SIME/DIME may have contributed to a family's
decision either to remain together or to separate. Specifically, the
rules in GIME provided a disincentive for marital break-up relative to
the rules in SIME/DIME.
In examining administrative rules and regulations written for each
experiment, varied explanations for the increase in the break-up of
household units may be given. For example, it was observed that an
experimental NIT resulted in less marital conflict among married women
who remained with their husbands than was experienced by similar
control women. However, in family situations with a history of
conflict over child-rearing practices, experimental payments may have
provided the economic alternative for families wanting to separate to
split earlier. Knowledge that it may be economically feasible to
separate from a family may make the ending of an unhappy union more
frequent. Evidence pointing to marital instability might also have
been shaped by whether or not traditional views about marital roles
were held among household units; i.e., the male being the traditional
"breadwinner. II
These findings suggest that differences in administrative rules and
regulations must be carefully integrated into any cross-experimental
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analysis of the four NIT/1M experiments. To date, in the NIT/1M
literature, only Kershaw and Fair (1976) and Christophersen (1983) have
attempted to relate the differences in rules pertaining to family unit
and income definitions among all four NIT/1M experiments and the
probable effects of these rules on behavioral outcomes not only in the
NIT/1M experiments themselves but also at the national level.
Implications for Social Work
This paper has attempted to identify particular variations of
administrative procedures, rules, and regulations which may impact on
program participants' behavior in making decisions about going to work
and/or remaining married. These two behavioral outcomes tested were of .
central concern to policy-makers during the field testing of the
NIT/1M experiments, and they remain so today, exemplified by Reagan's
emphasis on helping welfare clients attain "self-sufficiencyll by
getting a job. To illustrate, many states have implemented
work-support/work-oriented programs as a condition of receiving public
assistance payments, specifically in AFDC/AFDC-UP and Foodstamps. This
emphasis on work programs provides an excellent opportunity to ident,ify
and evaluate many of the administrative variables tested in the NIT/1M
experiments, such as determining the level a welfare participant is
better off by yorking as compared to receiving public assistance
benefits.
The NIT/1M experiments can also be used as an illustrative model
denoting the importance of developing evaluation procedures before an
actual program is implemented in the social environment. Because
program evaluation is always tied to fiscal concerns, evaluation is
necessary to ensure program accountability, efficiency, and
cost-effectiveness. Program evaluation can serve as an architectural
framework to identify program goals, objectives, and anticipated
outcomes in designing more responsive administrative systems to
address an identified target population's needs. Many social welfare
agencies in the past have no~ drawn upon controlled field studies;
i. e., quasi-experimentation in measuring program outcomes. ,Given the
fact that social welfare programs and activities are complex sets of
activities, administered, and evaluated by numbers of individuals, it
is extremely important 'to .know which variables tested did or did not
contribute to the overall outcomes. Conducting controlled field studies
to determine program impacts on client behavior may present a cleare~
picture to assess the relationship between variables; i.e., program
inputs and outputs. To illustrate, in measurjng the overall
effectiveness of work-oriented programs. evaluation under conditions of
controlled experimentation might focus on: a) the implementation of a
case-management system; and b) the relationship of job training to job
placement. By carefully defining variables to measure a client's
progress as well as measuring the client's progress against a
comparison group. results can he replicated to establish program
validity and reliability.
Secondly, rules and regulations defining family composition
patterns in the NIT/1M experiments can be used as case examples to
j. ,.
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acknowledge that clients come from a variety of family backgrounds and
choose to establish their own families in various forms. Program
administrators must recognize that the way administrative rules and
regulations are defined; for example, eligibility requirements may in
actuality not be supportive of family life. Therefore, program rules
and regulations must be evaluated to determine if they are supportive
of different family composition patterns and if they address the
wholistic needs of families, regardless of the lifestyle of that
particular family unit. To date, very little if any research has been
done to ascertain the effect of program rules and regulations on
client/family behavior, ranging from participation rates to the impact
of rules and regulations on attainment of selected treatment goals.
In designing more responsive administrative systems, evaluation
research is a necessary prelude to generate data to: streamline overall
program costs; coordinate and integrate existing- social services; and
respond more effectively to the needs of clients. In evaluating human
service programs in the fu~ure, it is hoped that administrative rules
and regulations will carefully be measured in assessing program impacts
on behavioral outcomes.
TAIlLE 1: MAIN FEATURES OF THE NIT/1M EXPERIMENTS
fXPERIMENT SITE(S) LENGTH Of' NUMBER OF TYPES OF
RACIAL GUARANTEE TAX RATES
OTHER
TREATMENTS fAMILIES FAHILIES COMPOSITION
LEVELS (AVERAGE) TREATMENT
ENHOLLEO ENROLLI::D OF SAMPLF: (FAMILY OF 4)PARTICIPANTS
CrlJan Trenton (12\) 3 years 1,357
Dual-headed Black P7%) $1,650 .3, .5, .7
None
(1%8-1972) Pa~er&on-pasGaic
White (3H) 2,457
(36\) Hispanic-
3,300
Jersey City (29\)
J\merican (JIl) 4,125
. Scranton (2)\)
(1968)
Rural Iowa (38l) 3 years 809
Dual-headed Black (35\) $1, HI .3, .5, .7 None
{19b9-19731 H.e. (62\ ) Single-headed
White (65\ ) 2,612
3.482
(1969)
'"
GlME Gary (100\) J years 1,780
Dual-headed BlacK (100\) $3,330 .4 .6
Daycare Subsidies 0
(1971-19741 Single-headed
4,300 of 35\, 60', 80\
.....
(197ll and 100%
SIME/OIME Seattle (43\) 3 years (71\) 4,900
Dual-headed Black (43\) $3,800 0.5, .7, .8 w/
Counseling, ~ducation
(1971-1983) Denver (57%) 5 years (25\) Sin91e-heade~
White (39\) 4,800 average ra t.ea and t.raining
1 years ( 4\) Chicano (} 6\) 5,600
of decline ot' subsidies of
(1971) zero {, .025/ ;0\ and 100\
$1,000
Sources: Robins" west. (1963). SIME(DIMI:: Final Report, VoLl, Part Ill, p. 62.
Spiegelman & 'iaeger. {l980). Journal of Human Resources. 15~4, p. 466,
Table 1.
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